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McKim: Congressional Intent and Judicial Response: The Consumer Credit A

Congressional Intent and Judicial Response: The Consumer
Credit Amendments of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act
On July 10, 1984, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 was signed into law by President Reagan.' The purpose
of the Act was to establish a new bankruptcy court arrangement consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in NorthernPipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.' and to amend certain provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. 3 Among the amended provisions were
a group that Congress and commentators alike have referred to as the
"Consumer Credit Amendments. ' 4 This comment will focus on those
amendments.
The Consumer Credit Amendments were due in large part to a concerted effort on the part of creditor lobbying groups who believed that
the 1978 Act favored debtors.5 As Senator Orrin G. Hatch stated at the
time of passage of the 1984 Act:
The number of consumer bankruptcy cases filed has risen
dramatically each year since the bankruptcy code was last amended in 1978. Several witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed to these changes in the Code as the principal cause
of the increase. The 1978 amendments generally eased a6debtor's
access to bankruptcy to avoid excessive indebtedness.
Not all members of Congress perceived the 1984 Act as a creditororiented bill. Representative Peter Rodino, who was instrumental in the
passage of the Act, stated that the "amendments are fair to both debtors
and creditors."17 The majority of the members of Congress and legal commentators, however, agreed with Senator Hatch's view that the amendments assured that the debtor under the bankruptcy code received a "fresh
start" and not a "head start."8
This comment will analyze the four most controversial amendments
under the 1984 Act. These amendments affect the debtor's discharge,
awards of attorney fees against creditors that object to discharge, reaf1. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 392 (1984).
2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Court's holding in Marathon declared the 1978 Act's jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts to be unconstitutional.
3. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 576.
4. See, e.g., id; Snider, Rochkind, Green, Stein and Welford, The Bankruptcy Amend-

ments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984, 63 MIcH. B.J. 775, 778 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Snider]; Martin and Fagan, A Guide to the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship
Act of 1984, 13 CoLo. LAW. 1775, 1778 (1984).
5. Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protectionfor Consumers:A Response, 72 GEo. L.J.

1333 (1984).
6. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 576, 597.

7. Id. at 576.
8.See, e.g., Snider, supra note 4; Warren, supra note 5;Williamson, Mimms and Taylor,
Consumer Credit Changes to the Bankruptcy Laws: A Hodgepodge for Creditorsand Debt-

ors, 58 FLA. B.J. 553 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. H7497, H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(statements of Representatives Brooks and Anderson).
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firmation agreements, and dismissal. Judicial response to the amendments
will be compared with Congress' ostensive intent, and the issues in need
of resolution under the Consumer Credit Amendments will be discussed.
Although the tenth circuit has yet to rule on any of the amendments
discussed, other courts have interpreted and applied them. This comment
will prepare the Wyoming lawyer for the issues and problems that are
likely to arise in connection with the amendments.
SECTION

523(a)(2)(C):

DISCHARGE

Background
Prior to the 1984 Act, a major problem was the debtor who would
essentially go on a spending spree by charging up to the limits of his credit
cards and then request discharge of the credit card debt in bankruptcy.'
A number of courts have held such a debt to not be dischargeable,'" but
only if the creditor could prove the debtor's intent not to repay. This often
entailed a showing of fraud on the debtor's part."
New section 523(a)(2)(C) is designed to appease the credit card lobby
by shifting the burden of proof.1 2 The amended section declares in relevant part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition;
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregatingmore than
$500 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual
debtor on or within forty days before the orderfor reliefunder this
title, or cash advances aggregatingmore than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end creditplan obtained
by an individualdebtor on or within twenty days before the order
for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable;
"luxury goods or services" do not include goods and services
reasonablyacquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer credit under
an open end credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this sub9. Snider, supra note 4, at 778.
10. Id

11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
12. Snider, supra note 4; Martin and Fagan, supranote 4; 126 BANKR. L. REPORTS
13 (1984).
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paragraph as it is defined3 in the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)1

Under the amendment, a discharge under sections 727, 1141 or
1328(b)' 4 is presumed not to be available for "consumer debts owed to a
single creditor aggregating more than $500 for 'luxury goods and services' "incurred within forty days of the order for discharge, or for cash
advances exceeding $1,000 that are "extensions of consumer credit under
an open-end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within twenty days" of the order for discharge.' 5 Thus, the presumption in the new
section runs in favor of the creditor.
Additionally, the amendment attempts to define "luxury goods and
services" by exclusion. "Goods and services reasonably acquired for the
support or maintenance of the debtor" do not fall within the ambit of luxury goods and services.1 6 Under section 523(a)(2)(C), if the creditor objects
to discharge the debtor may attempt to show that the debt was not incurred for luxury goods and services.
A Second Circuit case, decided after the passage of the 1984 Act but
before it became effective, illustrates the problem the new section is designed to solve. In In re Senty," the debtor held Citibank, Diners Club
and Carte Blanche credit cards. From July through September of 1982
the debtor vacationed in Europe and returned to the United States after
incurring substantial credit card debts. 8
In November 1982, the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 and sought discharge of the credit card debts. The three credit
card companies brought suit objecting to discharge under section
523(a)(2)(A).' 9 The court held that under that section a creditor need only
establish a prima facie case that a debt is nondischargeable to shift the
burden of proving dischargeability to the debtor.2 0
The court in Senty interpreted section 523(a)(2)(A) as requiring proof
of the elements of fraud.' In holding for the creditors, the court found
intent premised on the statement that "[clourts have generally held that
13. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). The emphasis added to the quoted code sections reflect the language that the author will focus on in this
comment.
14. Section 727 is the standard discharge section for an individual debtor filing for liquidation under Chapter 7. Section 1141 provides that the debtor will be discharged from
"any debt that arose before the date" of confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization
plan. Section 1328(b) applies to debtors filing for a hardship discharge of their debts under
a Chapter 13 payment plan. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
16. Id.
17. 42 Bankr. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
18. Id. at 458. The debtor accumulated a total debt of $62,372.06 on three different
credit cards.
19. See supra text accompanying note 13.
20. Citibank v. Senty (In re Senty), 42 Bankr. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
21. Id. at 459: "A case in fraud at common law requires proof of a material misrepresentation, knowingly made with intent to deceive, which statement is reasonably relied on by
the plaintiff to its detriment."
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a debtor's intent to deceive may be inferred upon proof that the debtor
knew or should have known of his insolvency and inability to repay the
charges incurred.' '22 The court proceeded to list a number of factors to
23
be considered when determining the debtor's intent to deceive. After
evaluating the facts in Senty based on these factors, the court concluded
that the debtor could not possibly have believed that he would be able
to pay off the credit card debts and accordingly denied discharge.2 4 The
creditor's burden of proving fraud under 523(a)(2)(A) is removed by new
section 523(a)(2)(C). When he falls within the scope of the amendment, the
debtor must disprove fraud at the outset of the case.
The first case involving section 523(a)(2)(C) was In re Smith, a Fourth
Circuit case decided June 18, 1985.21 Smith was a virtual expose on the
limits of the new section. The objecting creditor was a store that was attempting to block discharge of the debtor's account of $549.12.26 The
bankruptcy judge denied the creditor's objection for three reasons. First,
section 523(a)(2)(C) only applies to discharge under sections 727, 1141 or
1328(b). 7 The court pointed out that section 1328(b) was only applicable
to hardship discharges 28 and the debtor was not pleading hardship but
was seeking discharge under 1328(a). 29 The court held that section
523(a)(2)(C) did not apply to a section 1328(a) discharge.3 0
Second, the amended section only applies to debts aggregating more
than $500. The court found that the debtor opened his account on
November 27, 1984 and made a purchase on that date. The debtor petitioned for bankruptcy on January 11, 1985, more than 40 days after his
first purchase. 1 Although there were other purchases within forty days
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id
Id
Id
50
Id
11
11

at 459.
at 460.

Bankr. 573 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
at 574.
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
U.S.C.A. § 1328(b) (West 1979):
(b) At any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and
a hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed

payments under the plan only if-

(1) the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to circumstances
for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property actually
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not

less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim if the estate
of the debtor had been liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; and

(3) modification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not

practicable.
29. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West 1979):
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall

grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed

under section 502 of this title, except any debt(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
30. Belk Center v. Smith (In re Smith), 50 Bankr. 573, 575 (M.D.N.C. 1985).

31. Id at 574.
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of the debtor's petition, they did not total over $500 as required by
523(a)(2)(C) 2
Third, the court held that the debt did not fall within section
523(a)(2)(C) because it was not for "luxury goods and services." 33 The purchases made by the debtor were primarily for clothing which the court
held to be "reasonably acquired for the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.' '34
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the Smith case was a portion
of the opinion unrelated to the court's interpretation of the new section.
After the court had determined that the case was inappropriate for section 523(a)(2)(C), it imposed sanctions on the creditor's attorney under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a).3 5 The creditor's attorney was ordered to pay
the attorney fees that the debtor incurred in defending against the
creditor's objection. The court's reasoning was that "the complaint
was
36
neither well grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law."
Analysis
The new section 523(a)(2)(C) may raise more problems than it solves.
One glaring problem with the section is the definition of "luxury goods
or services." Without a more concrete definition, the question of whether
a debt is for "reasonable support and maintenance" is sure to be an oftlitigated question. Once in the courts, the question of what is needed for
the reasonable support and maintenance of the debtor becomes a subjective evaluation for the bankruptcy judge. The problem with such a subjective evaluation is that while the debtor may view expenditures on recreation and church contributions as vital to his well-being, the bankruptcy
judge may view the same expenditures as frivolous or unnecessary.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id
Id at 575.
Id
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a):
(a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed
in a case under the Code on behalf of a party represented by an attorney, except a list, schedule, statement of financial affairs, statement of executory contracts, Chapter 13 Statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose office address and
telephone number shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign all papers and state his address and telephone number. The
signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation.
If a document is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the person whose signature is
required. If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court on motion
or on its own initiative, shall impose on the person who signed it, the represented
party, or both, any appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the document, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
36. Belk Center v. Smith (In re Smith), 50 Bankr. 573, 576 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
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Second, the burden placed on the debtor to overcome the presumption of nondischargeability needs to be ascertained. Creditors who object
to discharge of credit card debts under section 523(a)(2)(C) are relieved
of the burden of proof they carried under section 523(a)(2)(A). Under the
old section, however, the creditor only had to establish a prima facie case
to shift the burden of proof to the debtor. 37 Unless the burden of nondischargeability in 523(a)(2)(C) is relatively substantial, the amendment
will be of only slight consequence. That Congress intended the burden
of overcoming the presumption to be formidable is indicated by the fact8
that section 523(a)(2)(C) is specifically applied to hardship discharges.
A debtor should have a difficult time pleading good faith failure to meet
a chapter 13 repayment plan and discharge of debts for luxury goods at
the same time.
Third, there are problems with the new section's time requirements.
Debts for luxury goods and services incurred within forty days of relief,
and debts under open-end credit plans incurred within twenty days of
relief, are not dischargeable. 9 By simple manipulation of the time re0
quirements a debtor can avoid section 523(a)(2)(C).' Thus, a case like
Senty" could still have been decided under section 523(a)(2)(A) even though
the abuse of credit card privileges in that case is a prime example of what
section 523(a)(2)(C) is designed to stop. The debtor in Senty returned from
Europe in September 1982, and filed for bankruptcy on November 3,
1982.41 The opinion does not state the specific day on which the debtor
incurred his last credit card charge. If it was prior to September 24, 1982,
however, the debtor would not come under section 523(a)(2)(C) and the
burden of proof would rest with the creditor.
Fourth, the Smith case also raises problems with the dollar requirements of section 523(a)(2)(C). The Smith court held that part of the
debtor's obligations were incurred prior to the forty-day period. Thus, the
debtor's "aggregate 41 3 debt was under $500 and did not fall within
523(a)(2)(C)." The problem with the Smith court's analysis lies in its definition of "aggregate." The new section makes no attempt to define the time
period of the aggregate of the debt.4 Certainly, a creditor does not keep
a different file for each purchase by the debtor; he keeps a running balance
or "aggregate" irrespective of any forty-day requirements. Under the
Smith court's approach, a clever debtor could charge up to $500 within
the forty-day period in addition to debts previously incurred to the same
creditor and avoid the 523(a)(2)(C) presumption. It would make more sense
to interpret the new section to mean "reaching an aggregate of more than
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Citibank v. Senty (In re Senty), 42 Bankr. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
Martin and Fagan, supra note 4, at 1782.
42 Bankr. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id at 457.
11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).

44. Belk Center v. Smith (In re Smith), 50 Bankr. 573, 575 (M.D.N.C. 1985).

45. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
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$500"11 after the forty-day period has started to run. Then when the debtor incurs additional debts to a single creditor within the forty-day period,
creating a single debt in excess of $500, the burden of proof would lie with
the debtor. This would lessen the impact of the forty-day limit as an instrument of abuse because the debtor could only charge up to $500 within
the forty-day period rather than adding $500 to his already existing debt.
Fifth, the finding in Smith that a debt of $549.12 for clothing was
not a debt for "luxury goods and services" also may bode ill for creditors.47
The court did not discuss the size of the Smith family but simply classified
clothing as necessary for support and maintenance. Of course, the problem is that unless the Smiths were the benefactors of a large family, $500
worth of clothing within forty days of a petition for bankruptcy is a rather
substantial sum. The court should have explained the circumstances surrounding its holding.
Finally, the court's imposition of sanctions in Smith is disturbing.
Granted, the creditor's attorney did not show up for the discharge hearing, but then, neither did the debtor's attorney." The creditor's attorney
was found at fault for requesting that the debt not be discharged after
the court found that discharge was appropriate. The court's motive in levying sanctions appears to have been to punish the creditor's attorney for
testing the waters of a relatively vague and complex new section in the
bankruptcy code. Indeed, the bankruptcy judge in Smith may not have
realized that his was the first opinion interpreting section 523(a)(2)(C), but
he certainly should have been aware that it was among the first. It seems
unjust that sanctions should be imposed for filing a complaint not "warranted by existing law" 49 when in fact no law beyond a bare statute existed when the complaint was filed.
SECTION

523(d):

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Background
The purpose of section 523(d) before and after the 1984 Act has been
to allow a debtor to recover attorney's fees from a creditor who hinders
the bankruptcy petition by objecting to discharge. 0 In the event that the
creditor's objection is denied, the debtor may ask for attorney's fees.
Amended section 523(d) reads as follows:
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of
a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id
In re Smith, 50 Bankr. at 575.
Id at 573.
Id at 576.
Prior to amendment, section 523(d) read:
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt
under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court
shall grant judgment against such creditor and in favor of the debtor for the
costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding to determine
dischargeability, unless such granting of judgment would be clearly inequitable.
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West 1979).
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debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in favor of the
debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the
proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was
not substantiallyjustified, except that the court shall not award
such costs and fees if specialcircumstanceswould make the award
1
unjust."
At the time of the amendment to section 523(d), many commentators
suggested that the new language favored creditors.52 Previously, the section called for the court to assess fees "unless clearly inequitable." 3 Commentators viewed the amendment as favorable to creditors because it required the court to find that the creditor was "not substantially justified"
and that no special circumstances mitigate in favor of the creditor before
assessing costs.
At least two commentators viewed the amendment as favoring
debtors.5 ' They pointed out that the new section contains the language
of a typical attorney's fees statute and emphasized that the court "shall
grant judgment in favor of the debtor" unless special circumstances dictate otherwise.5 5 Prior to the amendment there were few instances of
awards of attorney's fees, 6 but, according to the authors, the new language
has the potential for deterring creditors from fighting discharge.57
Still another commentator saw the amendment as striking a middle
ground between creditors and debtors:
The new standard seeks to strike an appropriate balance between
protecting the debtor from unreasonable challenges to
dischargeability of debts ... while deterring creditors from mak-

ing [unlreasonable challenges.... The new standard, however,
should not be read to raise a presumption that the creditor was
not substantially justified, simply because it lost the challenge.5 8
The case law reflects the foregoing controversy as well as the
bankruptcy courts' failure to effectively distinguish between the old and
new sections. A federal case decided under the old section denied attorney's fees to the creditorunder 523(d) and at the same time interpreted
Congress' intent under the 1978 Act to be debtor-oriented:
The congressional failure to award attorney's fees to prevailing
creditors was not accidental. Congress enacted section 523(d) out
51. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Snider, supra note 4; Montali, PreliminaryComments on the Bankruptcy
Code Changes Affecting Consumers, 12 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 6 (December 1984);
Williamson, Mimms and Taylor, supra note 8.
53. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West 1979).
54. Martin and Fagan, supra note 4, at 1782.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id "The standard of section 523(d) at best leaves creditors' counsel in doubt as

to the possible levy of attorney's fees and, at worst, substantially deters creditors from bringing arguably legitimate claims for nondischargeability."

58. 126

BANKR.

L.

REPORTS

(CCH) para. 307 (1984).
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of concern that creditors were using the threat of litigation to induce consumer debtors to settle for reduced sums, even though
the debtors were in many cases entitled to discharge.59
This conclusion was supported by cases holding that "absent a finding
of clear inequity, no judicial discretion" was permitted in determining
whether attorney's fees should be awarded under the old section 523(d).10
In cases decided after the 1984 amendments, this presumption in favor
of debtors began to erode.
In In re Fuerinsky,61 the bankruptcy court held that the plaintiff/creditor had failed to sustain his burden of showing clear inequity in
awarding attorney's fees to the debtor, and assessed "reasonable" fees
against him. 62 In a footnote the judge explained that new section 523(d)
was not yet in effect but observed that "[in the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, the Congress tilted toward a more
creditor oriented version of § 523(d). It is clear the version I must apply
here is more severe toward unsuccessful creditors.' '63
In re Jones64 was one of the first cases to be guided by the amended
section. The debtor sought discharge of a lease obligation running to the
plaintiff/creditor. The court held that the creditor had failed to sustain
his burden to defeat discharge but denied attorney's fees to the debtor.65
After quoting the new section 523(d) the court went on to state:
Some courts have found that only cases of "clear inequity" relieves
an unsuccessful creditor from the prospect of paying a discharged
debtor's costs of defending against a suit to determine nondischargeability. These courts would agree that "absent a finding
of clear inequity,66§ 523(d) does not provide for judicial discretion
in this matter".
The Jones court also discussed the legislative history of amended section 523(d). 6 This same legislative history was relied on by the Delaware
68
bankruptcy court in In Re Walter, an opinion denying attorney's fees.
59. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985).
60. Commerce Union Bank of Sumner County v. Watson (In re Watson), 44 Bankr. 183,
185 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (citing Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Carmen, 723 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1983)).
61. 41 Bankr. 724 (Ariz. 1984).
62. Id at 729. The determination of what were reasonable fees was left to the parties.
To guide the parties in their negotiations the court stated that in the event of a failure to
reach agreement "[ilt is unlikely I will award counsel fees of $23,010.00 for defending discharge
of a $4,206.82 claim."
63. Id at 728.
64. 49 Bankr. 431 (D.C. 1985).
65. Id at 437.
66. Id at 436 (citing Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Carmen, 723 F.2d 16, 18 (6th Cir. 1983)).
67. In re Jones, 49 Bankr. at 436. "The relevant legislative history ...states that the
purpose of the provision is to discourage creditors from engaging in the practice of initiating
suits of this type in the hopes of obtaining a settlement from honest debtors anxious to save
attorney's fees. Such a practice is contrary to the spirit of the bankruptcy laws and is therefore
sanctioned."
68. Walter v. Walter (In re Walter), 50 Bankr. 521, 522 (Del. 1985).
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The legislative history relied on by both courts,
however, was applicable
69
to the 1978 Act, not the 1984 amendment.
In Walter, the court held that a son's loan to his father for business
purposes was not a "consumer debt"70 under 523(d) and thus an award
of attorney's fees was not proper.' The court proceeded, in dicta, to address the question of whether the creditor was substantially justified in
objecting to discharge.7 2 Walter was based on a peculiar set of facts in
that the debtor's twenty-six year old son was the objecting creditor. The
court stated that even if the son "was not substantially justified, it would
not be fair to order him to pay his father's counsel fees. Congress did not
intend equally positioned private parties, absent73 an abusive filing, to bear
the expense of the other's cost of litigation."
Analysis
The effect of a statute is not determined until it is judicially interpreted. A court's interpretation may or may not rely on legislative history.
When a court relies on outdated legislative history, 74 the potential for confusion is clear. With the initial disagreement over the meaning of amended section 523(d), 75 a quagmire appears to be enveloping the amendment.
The effect of 523(d) on awards of attorney's fees against creditors remains to be seen because the initial cases discussed above have not
established any solid precedent. The bankruptcy judge in Jones76 quoted
the new section 523(d) but relied on case law, language and legislative
history relevant to the old section 523(d).77 Additionally, Jones involved
a lease which may not fall within the section 101(7) definition of consumer
debt.7 At any rate, the court did not discuss this aspect when applying
523(d) to the case.7 9 An attorney citing Jones would be well-advised to
exercise caution in offering the case as thorough, substantive authority.
Perhaps the Walter opinion contains a more searching analysis, but
at the same time the court's discussion of substantial justification was
dictum. Additionally, Walter involved an unusual fact pattern.90 The court
disposed of the case on the basis that a consumer debt was not sought
to be discharged.8 The court then went on to assume that a consumer
debt was involved and further that the creditor was not substantially
69.
523(d).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
dividual
79.
80.
81.

11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 1979). Walter was also decided under the amended section
Id. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
In re Walter, 50 Bankr. at 523.
Id.
Id
See supra text accompanying note 69.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
49 Bankr. 431 (D.C. 1985).
Id. See supra text accompanying note 69.
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West 1979): " 'consumer debt' means debt incurred by an inprimarily for a personal, family or household purpose."
In re Jones, 49 Bankr. at 431.
In re Walter, 50 Bankr. at 521. See supra text accompanying note 73.
In re Walter, 50 Bankr. at 522.
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justified.82 With each assumption, the court concluded that attorney's fees
would not be awarded. 3 The court's holding may be summarized by saying that a father may not recover attorney's fees under 523(d) from a son
who objects to discharge of a business debt owed by father to son.
Although this would have been an excellent case for denying attorney's
fees because of "special circumstances," the court did not rely on that
language.84
In summary, thus far the amended section 523(d) has controlled two
cases where attorney's fees were not awarded against the creditor. Neither
of the cases analyzed the "substantially justified" language as part of
the basis of its decision, nor did the two cases involve clear instances of
consumer debt. The language of section 523(d) is sufficiently vague so that
a court could set precedent favorable to debtors,85 contrary to the initial
predictions of the commentators, especially if the appropriate legislative
history is not brought to the court's attention.
It would seem that Congress intended to benefit creditors by changing the standard of "clearly inequitable" to "not substantially justified"
and by further adding that special circumstances will serve as a basis for
denying attorney's fees. A creditor should have an easier burden when
attempting to show that he was "substantially justified' (which calls for
a determination of what rises or falls to the level of "substantial") than
when attempting to show that an award against him will result in "clear
inequity" (which means it is either clearly inequitable or it is not). The
courts' recognition of this shift in emphasis should guide them in their
application of section 523(d) as well as in their examination of the
legislative history.8"
SECTION

524(c):

REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS

Background
Often a debtor may wish to stay in the good graces of a creditor by
executing an agreement with the creditor stating that the debtor will pay
the creditor despite past or future financial difficulties. Such agreements
are called reaffirmation agreements and are controlled by section 524(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code. In enacting subparagraphs (2)-(4) to amend section 524(c), Congress made it easier for a creditor to obtain reaffirmation
87
of a debt from the debtor prior to discharge:
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the
consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt
82. Id. at 523.
83. Id.

84. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1985).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
86. Lenzycki v. Nicholson (In re Nicholson), 51 Bankr. 198 (M.D. Fla. 1985) was decided on February 6, 1985. Nicholson involved another 523(d) decision which denied fees because
a business debt was involved rather than a consumer debt.
87. Snider, supra note 4, at 780.
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that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only
to an extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge
under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title;
(2) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement
which advises the debtor that the agreement may be rescindedat
any time prior to dischargeor within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving
notice of rescission to the holder of such claim;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable,
accompanied by a declarationor an affidavit of the attorney that
representedthe debtor during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states that such agreement(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by
the debtor; and
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior
to discharge or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with
the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of recission to
the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerningan individual who was not represented
by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement
under this subsection, the court approves such agreement as(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph(A)shall not apply to the extent that such
debt is a consumer debt secured by real property.88
Under the 1978 Act, section 524(c) required court approval for reaffirmation agreements because the general sentiment was that creditors
were harassing debtors into reaffirmation. 9 The process of judicial approval under the old section could be very time consuming and cumbersome for both the parties and the court because reaffirmation agreements
0
are relatively common and court approval was always required. The 1984
amendment disposes with court involvement to a great extent and thus
would appear to favor creditors. The procedure is faster and only involves
the debtor's attorney, who is more likely to follow the wishes of his client
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
89. Snider, supra note 4, at 780.
90. See, e.g., Midlothian State Bank v. Roth (In re Roth), 43 Bankr. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
In Re Bryant, 43 Bankr. 189 (E.D. Mich. 1984); In Re Malagesi, 39 Bankr. 629 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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than the court would be. Under the 1978 Act, the debtor's attorney undoubtedly examined the agreement before submitting it to the court, so
the 1984 amendment essentially eliminates the second stage of approval
that the creditor had to achieve. 9'
Unlike the former section 524(c), a debtor may now reaffirm a debt
as long as: 1) there is a "clear and conspicuous" statement in the reaffirmation agreement advising the debtor that he may rescind the agreement
any time prior to discharge or within sixty days after the agreement is
filed with the court; 2) an affidavit from the debtor's attorney has been
filed stating that the debtor is fully informed, that the agreement is voluntary, and that it does not impose an undue hardship; and 3) there has been
no showing that the debtor has abused the recission right.92 Court approval
is only required where the debtor is not represented by an attorney.9 3
Analysis
Section 524(c) is still in need of judicial treatment, but a number of
issues are certain to arise. First, whether the court will continue to be active in reviewing reaffirmation agreements remains to be seen. The old
section was clearly designed to ensure that the creditor did not take advantage of the debtor. The amendment sweeps away much of that protection by only providing for judicial approval when the debtor is not
represented by an attorney. There appear to be no means by which the
court can invalidate a reaffirmation if the debtor's attorney approves the
agreement. Without judicial review, creditors will no doubt begin to seek
reaffirmation from a tougher bargaining position, knowing that their
agreements with debtors will not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Debtors' attorneys should recognize that they now have a greater duty to protect their clients when reaffirmation is sought. When an attorney fails
to realize this duty, the court should be enabled to protect the debtor by
exercising the ultimate veto power over any reaffirmation agreements.
Second, the old section specifically exempted reaffirmation agreements
secured by realty from the requirement of judicial approval. 9 4 The amended
version of 524(c) does not change this provision when court approval is
necessary because the debtor is not represented by an attorney. There
is no provision, however, dealing with the question of whether the debtor
who is represented by an attorney must seek approval when the reaffirmation agreement is secured by real property. This could lead to a situation in which the debtor must incur attorney's fees because he is
represented by an attorney. In other words, the debtor could reaffirm
without the court's approval at no legal expense if he was not represented
by an attorney.
Third, as mentioned above, the amendment appears to place a great
burden on the debtor's attorney. One commentator has pointed out that
91.
92.
93.
94.

Snider, supra note 4, at 780. Contra Martin and Fagan, supra note 4, at 1783.
Montali, supra note 52, at 7.
11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
In re Moore, 50 Bankr. 301, 302 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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the potential for malpractice is great and that the attorney, unlike the
court, is not saved by judicial immunity.95 A situation could arise in which
the debtor wants to reaffirm but his attorney will not approve. Under a
literal interpretation of the statute, the debtor could be precluded from
seeking judicial approval. Likewise, if the court does not review the reaffirmation agreement, the debtor who does gain approval of his reaffirmation agreement by his attorney may later claim that the attorney failed
to adequately protect the debtor. Any ensuing malpractice litigation would
attorney to the debtor;
involve a determination of the duty owed by the
6
this is not clearly delineated by the statute.1
Congress attempted to make it easier to obtain reaffirmation
agreements by doing away with judicial involvement. Its intent may be
frustrated, however, in light of the foregoing considerations, by wary debtors and attorneys. Creditors may find that the former drawbacks of court
approval 97 have been replaced by protracted negotiation with debtors' attorneys who are attempting to protect both their clients and themselves.
SECTION

707(b):

DISMISSAL FOR SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE

Background
An amendment which is perhaps most symbolic of the preferential
treatment afforded creditors is new subsection (b) of section 707. Under
this section the court, on its own motion, may dismiss a bankruptcy petition for substantial abuse. This novel section was the source of much
debate in Congress and already has produced some noteworthy case law:
(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and
not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may
dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter
whose debts are primarilyconsumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantialabuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of grantingthe relief
requested by the debtor.9 '
Some of the bill's provisions that were the focus of debate and undoubtedly will be discussed in bankruptcy court opinions for some time
include: 1) only the bankruptcy court, and not creditors, may move to
dismiss for substantial abuse; 2) only debtors with "primarily consumer
debts" may have their petitions dismissed for substantial abuse; and 3)
99
there remains a presumption in favor of granting the debtor's petition.
Additionally, there has been substantial controversy as to° whether
a future income test should be applied by the bankruptcy court.1e In other
95.
96.
97.
98.

Williamson, Mimms and Taylor, supra note 8, at 554.
11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Supp. 1985).
See supra text accompanying note 90.
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).

99. Id.

100. Snider, supra note 4, at 780.
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words, should the bankruptcy court evaluate the debtor's future earning
capacity to determine whether or not he would be able to pay his creditors
under a Chapter 13 plan or some other installment method? If a future
income test is contemplated by 707(b), it follows that where a debtor appears to have sufficient future earnings, relief would be denied under
Chapter 7.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum argued that section 707(b) did not contemplate a future income test:
It would have forced bankruptcy judges to become soothsayers
and engage in the impossible task of predicting someone's earnings and financial obligations. Bankruptcy relief would have
become hostage to a judge's guesses about how much an individual
would earn, what their financial burdens would be, whether they
would become sick, unemployed, and so on. In some cases, because
judges are human, they would simply be wrong."'
Since only the court may bring a 707(b) motion, section 707(b) also
raises the issue of how the bankruptcy judge can know that the potential
for substantial abuse exists. 02 Furthermore, it has been noted that because
the court must make the motion and decide the motion, it plays the role
of both prosecutor and judge. 103 Unlike the other amendments discussed
in this comment, however, the courts have set to work in tackling some
of the issues raised by this new provision.
The first case to address new section 707(b) was In re Bryant, a North
Carolina case decided by Judge Wooten." °4 The court decided that review
of the debtor's petition warranted a 707(b) hearing because the debtor's
income exceeded his expenses by approximately
$200 per month and the
0 5
expenses listed were greatly inflated.

At the hearing on the court's motion, the debtor contended that his
debts were not "primarily consumer debts" and thus did not fall under
section 707(b). 10 6 The court, however, determined that the debtor's home
mortgages were consumer obligations and that the debtor intentionally
had omitted debts owed on at least seven or eight credit cards.0 7 The court
found that the debtor had the following debts, expenses and income:
101. 130 CONG. REC. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
See also 130 CONG. REc. H1941 (daily ed. March 26, 1984) (Chairman Rodino: "This provision would not create a future income test") but cf 130 CONG. REc. H7499 (daily ed. June
29, 1984) (Representative Anderson: "Furthermore, a bankruptcy court could dismiss a
Chapter 7 filing if, in its opinion, the filing constitutes a 'substantial abuse' of the Bankruptcy
Code because the debtor is found capable of fulfilling the terms of a Chapter 13 repayment
agreement.")
102. Section 707(b): Some Thoughts on "SubstantialAbuse" Dismissa4 1 NORTON BANKR.
L. ADVISER 8, 9 (January 1985).
103. Id.
104. 47 Bankr. 21 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
105. Id at 23. When the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy he must attach a schedule
of assets and liabilities unless the court directs otherwise pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 521(1).
106. Id. at 23.
107. Id.
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Consumer Debts .............................. $46,844.97
Non-Consumer Debts .......................... $40,248.00
M onthly Expenses ............................ $ 3,537.00
Incom e ...................................... $41,400.0010
The court denied the debtor's petition and in doing so made it clear
that 707(b) is a powerful tool enabling the bankruptcy judge to deny
bankruptcy to debtors he feels are undeserving. Judge Wooten wrote:
First, this case was brought, not because of the Debtor's
unemployment or an inability to pay on his part, but because he
simply decided to shuck a couple of his debts....
Secondly, the Court finds on the part of the Debtor an utter
disregard of his duties under the § 522 of the Code to truthfully
list all of his obligations, his monthly expenses, and to disclose
his general financial position to the Court....
Third, it is the opinion of the court that the Debtor's Statement
of Monthly Expenses filed with his petition was done in bad faith
and that these amounts were greatly overstated with the intention of misrepresenting his financial picture." 9
Many of the expenses claimed by the debtor were exorbitant." ' The
court stated that "it was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow
the Debtor to lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his
behalf.""'
The court recognized that the phrases "substantial abuse" and
"primarily consumer debt" were in need of definition. Of "substantial
abuse" the court simply said that the phrase would be given its ordinary,
plain meaning."' Judge Wooten, however, did not limit "primarily consumer debts" to the aggregate amount of consumer debt but said the court
should look at the relative number as well. The opinion held that the debtor's petition involved primarily consumer debts because the debtor's consumer debts exceeded his non-consumer debts by more than $7,000.00 and
113
numbered approximately twelve to five.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 24.
110. I& For example, laundry expenses were listed as $100 per month although the debtor
owned a washing machine. The debtor also listed expenses on his company car and his wife's
1984 Buick as totalling $731 per month.
111. Id.at 26.
112. Id.at 24.
112. Id.at 26.
113. Id.at 26. Five months after the Bryant decision, Judge Wooten decided another
707(b) motion in In re White, 49 Bankr. 869 (W.D.N.C. 1985). In that opinion, he held that
a debt for a personal injury judgment was not a consumer debt and because that was the
only debt listed by the debtor, the case did not fall under section 707(b). Id. at 872. The court
also reiterated its conclusion from Bryant that "substantial abuse" should be given its plain
and ordinary meaning. Id. at 873.
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Perhaps the most thorough analysis of any of the consumer credit
amendments appeared in In Re Edwards, decided July 5, 1985.1" 4 In that
case the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York addressed a number of the issues raised by section 707(b). The court brought
the 707(b) motion upon examining the debtors' schedule of debts and finding the only debts listed to be $10,500 for consumer purchases and $3,000
for student loans. Furthermore, the debtors had an annual gross income
of $60,000 with monthly expenditures of $2,366 including $250 for recreation. There was a budget surplus of $184. A hearing was ordered for the
debtors to show cause why their petition should not be dismissed under
section 707(b).' 1 5
The court did not dismiss the debtors' petitions. It based its decision
on affidavits submitted by the debtors which explained the debtors' inability to meet the requirements of a repayment plan the previous year
as well as their expectation of increased expenses upon the forthcoming
birth of their fourth child."16 In the course of the opinion, the court made
several observations concerning section 707(b). It held that section 707(b)
was to be applied as a motion for failure to state a claim for relief:
It is to be used to deny Chapter 7 relief to those persons whose
pleadings in the form of the petition, schedules, statement of affairs and statement of income and expenses fail to reflect a need
for the relief being sought because they do not reflect that the
debtor is now suffering or will suffer in the near future from any
meaningful economic hardship." 7
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Edwards decision was the
court's statement that "a debtor whose income and reasonable expenses
indicate that he would pay over three years an amount equal to 100% of
the principal owed to his creditors is not suffering from sufficient economic
hardship to warrant use of Chapter 7 '"i In other words, the court was
applying a future income test."9
In applying the future income test the court noted that upon the birth
of the debtors' fourth child, Mrs. Edwards would temporarily stop working and the debtors would lose a second income. Although the court
pointed out that $100 per month for recreation and church contributions
might not be appropriate for a debtor facing bankruptcy, it found that
114. 50 Bankr. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
115. Id at 935.
116. Id at 939-40.
117. Id at 936.
118. Id at 937.
119. Id n.3: "Both the legislative background to adoption of Code § 707(b) and the creditor
protections against bankruptcy abuse long found in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code
have caused the court to determine that the debtor's future ability to pay is the proper focus
of Code § 707(b)." The court did not indicate what legislative background it relied on in
reaching this conclusion.
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these were essential to some degree for family harmony.1 0 Taking these
factors together, the court concluded that "any doubts the court might
still have are overcome by the presumption in the Debtors' favor.',21
Finally, the court addressed the problem of procedure under section
707(b). After reviewing the court's procedure up to that time 22 the court
set guidelines to control future 707(b) cases. It stated that "in the future,
the court intends to notify the debtor that the debtor will be permitted
to testify if he wishes or rely solely on a written response. 1123
The court then went on to address the due process considerations involved with the proposed procedure under 707(b):
Applying such a procedure is logical, practical and reasonable. It
avoids unduly burdening the court with evidentiary hearings at
which it must be judge and prosecutor and displaces any possible
intrusion on constitutional due process constraints.... It seems

unlikely that Congress intended or envisioned that the court would
third-party witnesses in
engage in pretrial discovery or subpoena
24
connection with Code § 707(b).
In In re Grantthe Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Ohio
dismissed the debtors' petition under section 707(b).12 5 The court quoted
extensively from the House floor debates on the substantial abuse section and cited the Bryant and White decisions. The court found that the
to cut back on their extravagant lifestyle
debtors had made little attempt
26
and dismissed their petition.

In dismissing the petition the court stated that in considering section 707(b) cases it would consider four factors. They are: 1) whether the
debtor had sufficient future income to fund a chapter 13 repayment plan;
2) whether the debtors' petition was filed in bad faith; 3) whether the debtors had engaged in any eve of bankruptcy purchases; and 4) whether the
using the
debtor had suffered an unforeseen calamity or was "merely
'
chapter 7 provisions to gain relief from past excesses. 127
120. Id. at 940-41. In reaching this conclusion the court quoted from the United States
Supreme Court case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972): "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
or not to bear or beget a child." The judge in Edwards appears to have implied a right of
privacy as to certain expenses unless they are grossly disproportionate.
121. Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 941.
122. Id.
123. Id "In time, performance of the court's responsibility under Code §707(b) will become
as second nature to the court ... as the court's responsibility under Code § 329 to review
for excessiveness of attorneys' fees paid in contemplation of bankruptcy has become."
124. Id. at 942.
125. 51 Bankr. 385 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
126. Id. at 392. The court noted that the debtors had listed expenditures of $2,800 at
exclusive clothing stores as well as a $9,000 loan for Christmas items. The court posited
that "the Grants' Christmases must be quite an extravaganza."
127. Id. at 393-94.
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Analysis
Obviously, section 707(b) has been the object of much more judicial
development than the other amendments discussed in this comment. There
are, however, still questions to be resolved as well as questions raised by
the cases themselves.
The Bryantcase is an outstanding example of a court exercising broad
judicial discretion. Judge Wooten refused to give "substantial abuse" any
definition beyond its plain, ordinary meaning in Bryant."I Yet Judge
Wooten refused relief because he believed the debtor was trying to "shuck"
his debts, the debtor failed to truthfully list all of his obligations pursuant
to code section 522, and he believed that the debtor's statement of expenses was in bad faith. 2' Because Congress failed to delineate what would
constitute substantial abuse, Judge Wooten necessarily had to make a
somewhat subjective appraisal. The section does not mention bad faith,
however, which appears to have been the basis of Judge Wooten's holding.
Although the debtor in Bryant did not appear to be a forthright petitioner, it is not clear whether he could meet his financial obligations. His
petition for bankruptcy was dismissed on the basis of bad faith with no
analysis of his future ability to pay. In Edwards, no definition for
"substantial abuse" was given beyond a dictionary meaning, but the court
applied a future income test which the debtors failed and thus were granted
relief.' 30 Granted, the debtors in Edwards appeared to be acting in good
faith, but it seems somewhat arbitrary to throw the bad faith debtor in
Bryant at the mercy of his creditors without some determination of his
ability to satisfy the claims of those creditors. For the substantial abuse
provision to co-exist with the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code,
a future income test should be applied along with the bankruptcy judge's
subjective evaluation of the debtor's good faith, as was done in the Grant
fears about judge's
case.' 3 ' Without such a test, Senator Metzenbaum's
132
being human may prove to be all too real.
Another issue raised by the Bryant decision is the court's analysis
of what constitutes "primarily consumer debts.'1 33 The court's holding
that the number of consumer debts as well as the aggregate amount should
3 4
be considered presents an almost insurmountable obstacle for debtors,
because most individuals will have a greater number of consumer debts
than non-consumer debts. It would be a far more reliable gauge to analyze
consumer debt in terms of aggregate amount rather than relative number.
128. See supra text accompanying note 112; note 113.
129. See supra text accompanying note 109.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
131. See supra text accompanying note 127.
132. See supra text accompanying note 101.
133. See supra text accompanying note 113.
134. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 26 (W.D.N.C. 1984). In reaching its definition of "primarily consumer debt" the court stated that "it is my firm impression that Congress intended
to leave the definition of this term to the Bankruptcy Judge who has the case file before
him and who can make the decision in light of all the facts and circumstances presented."
No legislative history is cited in support of this proposition.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 13

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

When the debtor has a large number of low cost consumer debts, such
a test could arbitrarily lead to dismissal even though the debtor has incurred a tremendous aggregate debt trying to get his business or career
on a sound basis. Such efforts should not be punished because the debtor
may well have incurred the consumer debts expecting that his nonconsumer debt would bear the fruits of prosperity.
The Edwards decision's analysis of procedure under section 707(b)
presents some answers and some problems. 3 5 As a practical matter, the
court's statement of its intended future procedure under 707(b) is of value
to the bankruptcy practitioner who is confused as to how a section 707(b)
case may commence and be conducted.
The court's due process analysis, however, is not very convincing.'36
The court acknowledged that it holds the sole responsibility for promulgating the section 707(b) motion, for taking affidavits or testimony
and deciding the case.137 Because the court does not contemplate taking
extensive testimony or engaging in searching cross-examination, it implies that it is thereby rendered a fair adjudicator of its own motion." 8
No matter how a court chooses to handle section 707(b), a valid due process argument can always be made when a motion is brought and decided by the same person.
Finally, as one commentator has observed, the court is the only one
empowered to bring a section 707(b) motion, but in doing so the court must
overcome the section's presumption of relief for the debtor.'3 9 Thus, the
court must determine when its responsibility for overcoming the presumption creates due process problems. Section 320 of the 1984 Act provides
that the Supreme Court will prescribe rules controlling the procedure under
section 707(b).14 0 The Court should attempt to clarify how the bankruptcy judge can fulfill his conflicting roles without violating the Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION

This comment has focused on the most controversial of the Consumer
Credit Amendments. There are other important consumer credit amendments in the 1984 4Act with which the Wyoming bankruptcy attorney
should be familiar.'

Any legislation is the product of compromise and the Consumer Credit
Amendments are no exception.143 Many saw the amendments as a policy
reversal of the 1978 Act with a shift toward favoring creditors. As the.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
136. See supra text accompanying note 124.
137. Edwards, 50 Bankr. at 941.
138. Id. at 943.
139. See supra note 102, at 8-9.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 109(f), 522(d)(3) and (5), 524(f) (West Supp. 1985).
142. See supra text accompanying note 101; notes 8, 101.
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cases indicate, however, the pendulum is not swinging rapidly. Indeed,
in the first year of the amendments' operation, only two cases have been
dismissed for substantial abuse, the most potentially powerful amendment
for creditors.
The issues raised by the amendments are numerous. The Wyoming
practitioner who is confronted by the amendments should recognize the
arguments that can be turned to his or her client's advantage and present these to the court. There is no precedent in the Tenth Circuit but
the initial decisions of other jurisdictions are instructive.
The bankruptcy lawyer in the Tenth Circuit is faced with an opportunity to test the waters of a challenging new set of laws. The bankruptcy judges of the Tenth Circuit should scrutinize the work of their brethren
in other circuits before following their dictates. With the growing number
of bankruptcy cases,143 a cogent body of law is needed so that practitioners
and their clients can proceed confidently in the bankruptcy courts. With
predictability comes expediency, and for the parties involved this means
a reduction in the delay of debt collection and a quicker "fresh start."
BRADLEY SCOTT McKIM

143. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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